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INTRODUCTION
Background relating to  the  European
Administration,  Mostar (EUAM)
Union
1.  In September 1,993, during peace negotiations, the
idea was launched  and accepted in principle by all local
parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina,  that Mostar should  be
put  under  ternporary European Union  (EU)
administration  while a  permanent  solution to  the
problems of the city was sought. The matter was then left
pending until an overall peace plan for the former
Yugoslavia was introduced. Following an invitation
extended to the European Union by the parties who
signed the March t994 Washington Agreement,  the
Council formally  decided on 16 May 1,994(t) to carry
out a Common Foreign  and Security Policy (CFSP) Joint
Action, under the terms of Article J.3 of the Treaty on
European Union to cover support for the administration
of the city of Mostar, one of the cities most affected  by
the fighting. This Decision followed on from an earlier
Council Decision  of 8 November  1,993  ('?) to carry out a
Joint Action to support the convoying of humanitarian
aid in Bosnia and Herzegovina(3).
2.  The Council Decision of 1,6 May 1,994 provided for
an initial budget of up to ECU 32 million to be used to
finance the initial establishment  and the subsequent
actions of a new European  Union Administration of the
city of  Mostar (the EUAM).  Subsequent  decisions
increased the total available budget to ECU 144 million
(see paragraph 3L).
3.  The EUAM formally  cornmenced operations on
23 Jrly 1994, when the Administrator took up his
appointment  in Mostar. The EUAM's initial mandate was
for a maximum of two years, ending, at the latest, on 22
July 1996 (a).
The Court's audit
4.  Pursuant to  the Treaty (5) and following  the
invitation of the Council contained in Article 3 of the
Council Decision of 16 Mav 1994. the Court of Auditors
(1) Council Decision 94I308/CFSP of 16 May 1.994.
(2) Council Decision 93l603lCFSP of 8 November 1993.
(3) The situation  on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina  in the
winter of 1993194, with the Bosnian Serb forces hindering
access for the humanitarian aid convoys  meant that the
initially proposed Joint Action could not be implemented.
(a) Council Decision 94l790lCFSP  of 12 December  1994,lar.er
reaffirmed in Council Decision 951517/CFSP  of 4 December
1995.
(5) Article 188 C of the Treaty establishing  the European
Community.
carried out in 1,995 an integrated audit of both the
operations of the EUAM and the accounts of  the
Administrator. These accounts included  finance directly
provided by the-EU Member  States, as well as from the
general budget of the European  Union.
5.  The Court examined whether all  revenue  to
31 August 1995 was received and all expenditure to that
date was incurred in a lawful and regular manner and
whether the financial  management was sound.
6.  Two audit visits were undertaken to  Mostar,
comprising a prelirninary visit from 3 to 5 July 1995,
followed by a final visit from 23 to 31 October 1995.
During the audit, the progress of the EUAM towards
meeting its objectives was reviewed,  the EUAM's systems
of internal control were examined,  and an assessment
made of their effective  functioning.  The audit of revenue
was carried out on the basis of the arnounts established
as due under the terms of the different  Council Decisions
and the amounts actually paid to the Administrator's
account. The audit of expenditure  was carried out on the
basis of both commitments  undertaken  by the EUAM
and payments  made up to 31- August  1.995.
7.  The visits on the spot enabled the Court to see at
first hand the difficult conditions in which the EUAM
team was working, resulting from the continuing  tensions
between the different parties, sporadic shelling of the city,
the ruined state of most of East Mostar, the suffering of
the population during and after the phases of open
conflict, the breakdown of normal services and the
collapse of the economy. The strong team spirit within
the EUAM has contributed greatly to what has been
achieved.
OBJECTIVES  OF THE EUAM
8.  The Memorandum of  Understanding  on  the
European Union Administration of Mostar ('the MoU'),
signed on 5 July 
"1,994,  by the EU and 'Western European
Union (\fEU) Member States and the different parties
involved in the former conflict, sets out various aims and
objectives to be achieved by the EUAM. These were
further developed in a strategy document dat'ed 13 May
1995 prepared by the Adrninistrator.
9.  The central obiective  set out in the MoU is to create
the conditions leading to a unified city of Mostar. While
the EUAM is not explicitly required to achieve a single
administration  for Mostar, this remains  the fundamental
target. The EUAM has therefore been working with lqcal
parties to overcome  the present division of Mostar, and
to create a suitable  climate that could lead to a cornmon
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11.  The principal
overall EUAM strategy
prepared, were that:
assumptions against which the
document of L3 May L995 was
democratic  elections (before the end of the EUAM's
mandate), and a return to normal life for all of its
citizens.
10.  The main criteria considered in the EUAM strategy
document  to be fundamental to the concept of a unified
citv include:
(a) a population  willing to live under a common set of
rules;
(b) a central municipal authority acceptable to  the
population;
(c) a common  legal framework and guaranteed rights'
for all citizens;
(d) a common public service, tax system, and police
force; and, most importantly,
(e) freedom of movement  for all citizens  residing in the
city.
IMPLEMENTATION  OF THE MISSION  OF EUAM
13.  The information contained  in paragraphs  14 to 30
is taken from progress reports of the EUAM and files of
the  Administration on  its  different  activities,
complemented and  confirmed by  on-the-spot
observations  during the audit missions.
14.  At 31 October  1995, when the audit work on the
Spot was completed,  Mostar, a city with a population  of
about 60 000, was still nearly totally divided into Muslim
controlled Eastern and Bosnian Croat controlled'Western
parts. Despite ongoing attempts by the EUAM to
negotiate and achieve more progress relating to freedom
of movement, no consensus had been reached  between
the two sides. 250 persons on each side (excluding men
of military age) were able to obtain perrnits to cross to
the other side of Mostar each day. A small number of
people belonging  to certain professional  groups were also
able to obtain ID cards enabling them to cross the
demarcation lines. 'West Mostar Police, however,  created
continual  problems over the question of unobstructed
access of  people from Mostar East to the EUAM
Headquarters, situated in Mosfar \W'est.
15.  The EUAM has experienced  major difficulties in
achieving progress towards a unified police force. Despite
this having earlier been identified as one of the most
important tasks agreed in the MoU, local forces in 'Sfest
Mostar steadfastly opposed the speedy development of
such a body. Phase 1 of the unified police programme  has
however, been completed.  This  involved the
establishment  of a joint oper4tions centre, improvements
in police communications, and joint patrolling  between
WEU and East Mostar police, and WEU and 
'W'est
Mostar police on the demarcation  line between both
parts of the city. Under the terms of a signed agreement
of  18 September  1.995, Phase 2  provided for the
establishment of joint headquarters, the beginning of
joint patrols between East and 'West Mostar and NTEU
police, and the intensification  of the process designed to
replace the existing police forces in Mostar West and
East. Implementation of this phase was being blocked at
the time of the audit.
t6.  Article 21 of the MoU provides  that all funds
which the local parties (i.e. the two administrations for
the 'West and East) have at their disposal for the
administration  of the city will be made available to the
EUAM Departrnent of Finance and Taxes, which will
integrate them into the city's budget. This has not,
however, been respected.  Even though the  two
adrninistrations  receive funds frorn outside thev do not




(a\ the Federation  between the Bosnians and the
.  Bosnian-Herzegovinan  Croats would remain intact
and develop further;
the United Nations Protection  Force (Unprofor)
would remain in the region with its existing strength
unchanged;
the shelling of Mostar by the Bosnian Serb Arrny
(BSA) would not reach a level that rendered the task
of the EU Administration  impossible;  and,
the EUAM would progressively  gain the confidence
of the citizens of  Mostar, and not be totally
obstructed in achieving its aims and objectives by
any of the different parties.
1,2.  In addition to the EUAM's main aim of creating
the conditions leading to a unified city of Mostar, there
are other objectives,  drawn from the MoU, and further
developed  in the EUAM's  strategy document.  These cover
the different areas of intervention  of the EUAM, and are
summarize d in Annex 1 . Although the objectives  in the
MOU were not quantified, which makes evaluation  of
progress difficult, they were wide-ranging.and  ambitious,
in a situation of continuing conflict and ongoing mistrust
and tension between the parties who were to come
together.No C 28714 fEN i Official Journal of the European Communities 30.9. 96
1,7.  At the time of the audit, only limited progress had
been made towards the objective of  an  unified
administration. Subsequent  developrnents, for example
the signing of the Bosnian peace accords in Paris on
14 December t995 and the agreement on Mostar
obtained in  Rome on 18 February 1.996, provide
opportunities for a greater degree of cooperation betryeen
the parties and the EUAM.
18.  Despite the above difficulties, the EUAM has
pushed forward with the remainder of its programme.
This has principally involved working together with the
local adrninistrations and the utilities. companies of East
and 'West Mostar to reconstruct and redevelop  rnuch of
the damaged infrastructure of Mostar, and the launching
of certain economic initiatives. In a few cases the EUAM
has supported  projects  outside the official area under EU
Administration, (the 'Blue Zone'), because of  the
important  job creation possibilities.
19.  Initially, the most important tasks were to
re-establish  water and power supplies in the city. By
March 1995 water had been restored to all districts,
except for the high areas, which did not have ,an
adequate supply before. A special prograrnme of leak
detection  and repair has been undertaken.
20.  Concerning  power supplies, the first objective  was
to connect East Mostar with low voltage cable so that
households could have electricity. This was achieved  by
November 1,994. Between then and March 1"995, the
EUAM worked on a high voltage connection from the
West to the East. Progress on this was held up by the
'West, which tried  unsuccessfully'  -  to  use the
connection as a lever to gain control of a hydro-electric
site in the hands of the East. In September 1,995, because
of opposition from Electropriveda BIH(') in Sarajevo an
EUAM plan to provide additional energy for the city and
the Neretva Valley failed, with the result that there is still
insufficient power for industry in the area.
21,. An early task of the Administration was to
organize the clearance of rubble from the streets. In the
field of reconstruction,  more than 3 500 slightly damaged
buildings in the East and the 'W'est have been repaired,
with a further 2 000 dwellings in Mostar East scheduled
to receive  glass for windows by the end of 1,995. A
number of public buildings have been repaired. Various
rneasures have been taken to strengthen  the capacity of
(1 B"r-"" El.ctricity Board.
the local construction industry, and, after <lelays, a plant
hire agency for East Mostar has been established(?).
22.  In the economic sector, the EUAM launched its
Investment Support Programrne  (ISP) for large public
companies in the textile, concrete, metal construction,
equipment  and fruit juice industries, as well as supporting
470 small and mediurn  sized enterprises through its Small
Enterprise Programme (SEP). This support  covers
reconstruction of  buildings and premises and the
purchase of new machinery  and equipment,  as well as
management training  courses.  Preliminary findings arising
from an evaluation carried out in East Mostar of phase L
of the SEP. programme, revealed,  however, that the
results were less satisfactory  than had originally been
hoped for. At the end of September "1,995, some 28"/" of
the client enterprises  had used less than 10 % of their
allocated grants, while 57% had used less than 1'0"h of
their loans (8).
23.  The only nominally functioning  joint enterprise
project between Mostar East and Mostar West is the bus
company which has operated  a service since April 1-995.
The service is operated by two agencies, in the East and
in the'W'est, with a common management  board chaired
by the Head of the EUAM Department of Economy,
Transport  and Infrastructure  (DETI).  However, the buses
still operate on strictly separate  routes in the East and the
'West, and the fares paid are retained  separately  by the
agencies on each side.
24.  The repair of roads has also commenced, along
with work on all but one of the bridges within the
EUAM's area of responsibility. 'Work on the Tito bridge,
the Bailey bridge at Potoci, and two footbridges to
replace the Kamenica  and the historic Stari Most bridges
over the Neretva river, has been completed. The largest
proiect, that of the Carinski Bridge was opened on 30
April 1996. ln L995 work is also due to commence  on
the Hasan Brkid bridge (East Mostar) and the Aviator's
bridge in '\ilfest Mostar, both of which will only be
completely  repaired  after the end of  the EUAM's
mandate.
25.  Telecommunication  links have also largely been
re-established in  the city. An  agreement for  the
(t) Tt. *tgt*l intention was that the plant hire agency should
be located both in the West and the East. For various
reasons, including the fact, that alternative plant capacity
existed in the \ilest, it was decided to limit the location of the
agency to East Mostar. In current conditions it is likely to
serve East Mostar only.
(8) The funds not used were being held in the accounts of the
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establishment of  a  common Post  and  Tele-
communications Organization (PTT) in Mostar, has been
signed by both sides, but had not been implemented at
the end of 1995.
26.  In  the  field  of  public health, extensive
rehabilitation  has been undertaken of war damaged
medical structures, located mainly in East Mostar. An
extensive  pest control carnpaign has been undertaken.
The Administrator decided that the project to complete
and equip the Bijeli Brijeg central hospital in 
'W'est
Mostar should not be carried out in the absence of
satisfactory  guarantees regarding free access to it for all
citizens.
27.  Vith  regard to  education and culture, 1,2
elementary  schools have been repaired, along with three
kindergartens, and several historical buildings. Further
extensive work is still in progress. A programme of
measures to enable three secondary  schools to be used
through  the winter of L994195  was also completed. The
complete reconstruction  of two secondary schools has
commenced, but further reconstruction relating to other
secondary schools is still subject to a political decision
about common education and free access to all schools
for all pupils. These pre-conditions, insisted upon by the
EUAM, had not been fulfilled at the time of the audit.
28.  In the field of cultural life, youth and sports, the
EUAM has financed  reconstruction  of different  sports
buildings, 10 open air sports fields and supported  20
local sport clubs, in addition to financing youth and
cultural  exchange prograrnmes.
29.  In June 1995 a pilot housing programme was
introduced, to repair 78 apartments,  80 structures  in
Mostar East, three apartment  houses and other structures
in Mostar 'West. Displaced  persons were enabled to
occupy them, thus freeing other apartments  for their
original owners to move back into.
30.  The UNHCR(e) and various non-governmental
organisations,  supported by ECHO (10) provided food
(t) Offl.. of tn. United Nations High Commissioner  for
Refugees.
(10) The European Community Humanitarian Office which is
the'service  of the Commission  responsible  for humanitarian
assistance.
supplies that were then delivered by  government
organizations  and non-government organizatrons to both
parts of the city. Fuel and other heating material was also
provided. A spring sowing programme was supported  to
reactivate  agricultural production.  Public and semi-public
kitchens  prepared 15 000 meals a day for special groups,
representing  approximately  25 % of the total population
of the city.
BUDGET AND EXPENDITURE  OF THE EUAM.
EUAM budgetary resources
31.  As shown in Table 1, the EUAM's combined
budget, for the period July 1,994 to July 
'1,996, totalled
ECU 1,44 million. Total EUAM funding amounts to
nearly ECU 2 400 per person in Mostar (based on the
estimated population  of 60 000), to which may be added
an additional  estimated  indirect cost of nearly ECU 35,0
million, ECU 585 per person(ll). This represents a high
concentration of assistance in this area.
32.  The 1,994 EUAM budget  amounted to ECU 32
million, with ECU 15 million financed frorn the
European Community gerieral budget by  the
Cornmission, and ECU 17 million from Member  States.
The ECU 15 rnillion was initially made up of ECU 10
million from Budget Line 87-010 (i2) and ECU 5 million
from ECHO,  already approved for the International
Managernent Group  Infrastructure for Bosnia  and
Herzegovina  (IMG-IBH). This last arnount was to be
managed by ECHO, and not by the EUAM. This was
subsequently modified, however as the Adrninistrator  did
not accept that part of his budget was already earmarked.
Alternative funds were, therefore, found by  the
Cornmission. The ECU 17 million from the Member
States was provided by direct contribution, assessed
according to the GNP key (see Table 2).
(tt) On the assumption that it  costs the Member States an
approximate ECU 79 700 per annum over a two-year
period, per  person, to  equip, send and  maintain
approximacely  181 
.$ffiU police and 39 expacriate civil
staff.
(12) Out of the ECU 14,L5 million carried  over from 1993 under
the first CFSP Decision for a Joint Action supporting
humanitarian  aid convoys in  Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The
balance of ECU 4,15 million was used for the United
Kingdom  Overseas  Development  Organization (ODA) airlifc
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33.  The 1995 budget for the EUAM was set at ECU
80 million, entirely financed from the EC budget. This
was made up of:
(a) ECU 20  million provided in  the  second
supplementary  budget of "1.994 by the Parliarnent  for
the Mostar hospital;
(b) ECU 60 million from the 1995 budget, comprising
ECU 10 million on the operational budget line
(BS-100), and ECU 50 million in the reserve. On
18 Joly L995 this ECU 50 million reserve was
transferred  to budget line 88-L00.
34.  The 1,996 EUAM budget covering a seven-month
period to the planned final end of EUAM operations,
amounts to ECU 32 million, entirely financed from the
EU general budget(13).
EUAM expenditure
35.  Table 3 provides a sectoral breakdown of the
EUAM's actual expenditure in  1994 and 1995,  as
cornpared with the original and revised budgets.
36.  In the original estimates  prepared for the 1,994
budget, the most important  sectors were health and social
dervices, followed by  economic sector support
(investment promotion),  municipal  administration  and
unified police, transport infrastructure and equipment,
and construction sector/housing  repair.
37.  Table 3 shows that the revised budgets and actual
expenditure  did not, however, follow this pattern owing
to the continually changing situation on the ground in
Mostar. Most expenditure was instead incurred in the
sectors of public utilities (water and sanitation,  power
and telecom),  construction/housing  repair, and economic
sector support (investment promotion).
38.  During 1995 the EUAM rnade rwo revisions to its
original  budget, in response to changes in the overall
political situation. The rnost significant change was a
reduction  of the health and social services budget by ECU
12 million, mostly representing funds no longer required
for the completion and equipping of the Bijeli Brijeg
central hospital in Mostar. In conrrast, public utilities
and housing repair programmes,  which made more rapid
progress than had been expected, had their budgets
F  d".tlEecision  95/552/CFSP of 19 December  1995.
increased. The  budget provision for  transport
infrastructure was also reduced as plans for two new
bridges were postponed ftom 1995 :until 1,996.
39.  Table 4 shows that in 1'gg4 in several sectors and
in  1,995 in  the construction sector, the amounts
committed  exceeded the amounts in the agreed budgets.
This was largely beiause of the lack of  adequate
procedures  at the beginning of the EUAM's mandate  for
authorizing 'expenditure, and  insufficiently  rapid
procedures to change the budget allocations between
sectors. Also, as is noted in paragraphs 74 and 75, the
EUAM's ability io monitor expenditure  against budget
was limited during most of the first 18 rnonths  because it
had inadequate reporting  systems. Total commitments,
however,  rernained within the total btrdget of  the
EUAM.
ORGANIZATION  OF THE EUAM
Establishment  of the EUAM
40.  In mid-Aprll 1994, i.e. before the formal Council
Decision on the Joint Action, a three-person Advance
Party, sent out by the Ad boc Council Group, arrived in
Mostar to prepare for the arrival of the Administrator.
The Advance Party submitted 28 separate reports to the
Presidency. of the Council. Many of these reports  required
written responses  containing  comment, guidance, advice
or  approval. Such responses, however, were not
forthcoming.
41,.  There was no formal Council rnechanism in place
at the time to ensure that adequate funding was provided
for the advance  operation.  Loans totalling ECU 32 500
from the European Comrnunity Monitoring Mission
(ECMM)  were arranged during June and July 1.994, to
fund the advance operations.  These sums were brought in
cash to Mostar from Zagreb and Split by courriers.
Further cash amounts totalling ECU 53 000, were
financed from the German Federal  Budget. The Council
then made a one-off payment of ECU 100 000 from its
administrative  budget, which, amongst other things,
enabled the advance party to repay the ECMM's  earlier
loans.
42.  The Council classified the expenses of the Advance
Party as administrative expenses under the terms of
Article J.ll  of the Treaty on European Union. The
Council considered that in certain circumstances,  and on
a decision of the Council, administrative expenditure on
the CFSP could inolude 'les frais pr6paratoires i  la rnise
en oeuvre d'une action op6rationnelle (frais de voyage et
de s6jour des personnes  vis6es ci-dessus et soutien
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personnes)'(tu). This decision of general principle  was
endorsed for the EUAM Advance Party bv the Council
on 11 Jaly 1994(1s).
43.  The European Parliament  has, however,  pointed to
the need for care in defining what is adrninistrative and
what is operating expenditure in respect of CFSP joint
actions(r6),  and frorn what part of the European Union
budget such expenditure should be financed. It proposed
that only administrative  expenditure for the purpose of
political decision making in the Council, which must be
incurred before the Council takes a decision to allocate
funds, should be financed from the Council's budget. Aty
administrative expenditure  incurred after the Council has
taken a  decision should be  financed from  the
Commission's administrative appropriation  (Part A of
Section III) and all operating expenditure chargeable  to
the EU budget should be financed from Cornmission
operational appropriations  (Part B of Section III)(1?).
44.  Subsequently, in the context of the procedure for
the supplementary and amending budget No 2 for the
1.994 financial year, the Parliament pointed to the need
to tackle the definition and content of an item of
administrative or operational expenditure relating to the
CFSP before embarking on actions which might place the
budgetary  authority before faits accomplis.
45.  The work of the Advance Party formed part of the
setting up of the action and so in this case the nature of
the expenditure  incurred can be regarded as operational.
Such expenditure by the Commission in other areas of
the budget is  normally financed from operational
appropriations.
46.  tffhile the Advance Party was preparing the
ground in Mostar, the Member States, on the basis of
proposals for the organrzation of the EUAM made by the
German delegation including a suggested allocation of
posts, nominated expatriate staff (18) to the EUAM. The
Administrator  was not consulted. Only one Member
State proposed  more than one candidate for a post. The
arrival of the staff in  Mostar was not adequately
coordinated with the Advance Party, leading to logistical
(14) Doc. 7622/94, paragraph 3 (b) (i) of 'Note I'.
(15) Doc. 8239/94 CFSP 201 COYUG29.
(16) Notably in the Report of the Committee on Budgets on the
financing of the CFSP of 18 October  1994 (rapporteur Mr
F. Willockx).
(1?) The Council and the European Parliament have  a
gentleman's  agreement  whereby  they do not interfere in each
other's budget.
(18) Including the \UEU police contingent.
problems.  Also, ECHO  sent out a Humanitarran Adviser,
but with reporting lines to ECHO rather than the
Administrator. At the same time Italy also sent a
Humanitarian Adviser. These two remained  somewhat
uneasily for  three months, until the Administrator
obtained the approval of the Council Presidency to the
appointment of a single Humanitarian  Coordinator  from
Denrnark.
47.  Specific concerns raised by the Advance Party on
several occasions during May 1.994 with the Council
Presidency,  concerning the overall structure of  the
EUAM, and the appointment  terms of personnel,  went
unanswered. It also remained  unclear to the Advance
Party which department,  or individual  within the Council
or  the  Presidency was  responsible for  overall
coordination.
Strucfure of the EUAM
48.  At its meeting of 18 April 1'994, the Council
formally appointed Mr H. Koschnick, former Mayor of
Bremen,  as the EU Adrninistrator  for Mostar.  Once
Unprofor had finally demilitarized Mostar, and both
parties to the former conflict had signed the 10 June
1994 Memorandum  of Understanding on the European
Union Administration of  Mostar, the Administrator
formally arrived on 23 Jrly  1,994 and the EUAM
commenced operations.
49.  .Annex 2 sets out the organization  structure of the
EUAM, as at 6 October 1995. This is largely unchanged
frorn the original situation in July 1.994, except that,
primarily to create a post of Department Head for
another  Member State, a split was made in early 1'995 to
the Department of Education  and Culture to create  a new
Department of  Cultural Life, Youth and Sport.
Subsequently,  the head of the Department also took on
the role of Telecommunications  Advisor.
50.  The organizational structure of the EUAM is
complex,  and not entirely designed on functional lines.
The number of departments and adviser posts is large
and the breakdown  of responsibilities between them is
partly based on the need to provide acceptable portfolios
for the persons nominated  by the Member States. The
Refugee Adviser and the Telecommunications  Adviser
have budgets but no departments. It would have been
more logical to  integrate the  reconstruction of
telecommunications  into  one of  the  operational
departments.No C 28718 tEN I Official Journal of the European  Communities 30. 9. 96
51,.  The EUAM, including the ombudsman's  office(1e),
is staffed by 39 expatriate civil staff, 6 additional  staff
provided by the ECMM, along with a \fEU police
element of 18L police officers. They are all supplied by
the Member States, with their monthly  salaries and living
costs paid directly by their countries of origin, or as in
the case of two Comrnission staff seconded to the EUAM
Department of Finance and Taxes, by the Cornmission.
The costs of these expatriate staff and police officials  are
estimated to amount to approximately ECU L6,8 million
per annum and are not included in the budget of the
Joint Action.
52.  Formally each EU Administration operational
department is headed by an EU Head of Department
with two co-heads,  from East and 'West Mostar. The
co-heads do  not, however, have any operational
responsibility within the EUAM itself.
53.  Sweden, Finland and Austria, who had earlier been
observers in  the Council groups, contributed four
officials to the operation in Mostar before they formally
became EU Members. All the other EU Member States
have contributed officials to the EUAM and/or the WEU
police operations. In addition Switzerland and Norway
have provided two staff to the EUAM.
54.  The senior management  team to implement the
programme was established by allocating the posts
between the Mernber States, with no assessment of
alternative candidates  at Council level and without the
head of the organizatron  able to exercise  influence  on the
composition of  the team. The majority of  the
appointments  have proved to be successful, and
perhaps 
.because in the circumstances  of Mostar there
was no alternative  tearn members have generally
worked well together. However, the procedure followed
could easily have led to a very different result.
DECISION MAKING STRUCTURES
55.  CFSP Joint Actions fall under Articles J.3 to J.11
of Title V of the Treaty on European Union. It is the
Council which decides that a matter should be the subject
of a joint action, and which lays down the specific scope,
(t') An EU ombudsman  was provided for by Council  Decision
94l776lEC  of 28 November  1994. Any person in the EU
administered  area may appeal to the ombudsman  about any
decision of the Administrator which he/she claims violates
his/her rights, provided  all other legal remedies have been
exhausted.
the Union's general and specific objectives in carrying out
such an action, if necessary  its duration, and the means,
procedures and conditions for its implementation.  The
Council Presidency is responsible  for the implementation
of cornmon  measures, and the Commission is fully
associated in such tasks.
56.  In accordance with the requirernents  of Article J.5
of the Treaty on European  Union, and as set out in the
Council Decision of  1,6 May  1"994, the Council
Presidency, assisted by an advisory working party of
Member State Permanent Representatives,  and in
association with the Commission, decides upon the
practical orientations of the EUAM operation. It  also
determines the precise actions  required to meet the needs
identified by .the Administrator,  and decides  upon the
release of funds to the account  of the Administrator.  The
Administrator is required to report regularly to  the
Council Presidency on his requirements and in turn the
Presidency  keeps the \Torking Party informed. The
EUAM is not specifically required to report to the
Commission on its progress  under the terms of the
Council Decisions, despite the fact that funding is
provided from the EU general budget.
57:  In  practice, .the Ad hoc Group on Former
Yugoslavia,  which incorporates  the Advisory  'l7orking
Party on the Bosnia-Herzegovina  Joint Action, consisting
of  Member State representative's, as rbferred to  in
Article J.11 Part 1 of Title V of the Treaty,  has acted'as
the body responsible for preparing the work of the
Council Presidency  and for carrying out the tasks
assigned to it by the Council. The EU CFSP Joint Action
in Mostar normally appeafs only as an item on the
agenda whenever  the Ad hoc Group rneets, and the
practical implications of decisions are not discussed in
great detail. Important decisions in the Advisory'Working
Party are also not normally  taken directly, but instead are
often subject to delays for further consultations with the
capitals of the Member States. At the time the Ad hoc
Group negotiated  the MoU, which was finally signed on
5 July '1.994, many practical questions  raised by the
'Advance Party' (see paragraphs 40 to  47) went
unanswered.  Similarly, practical  advice submitted by the
Commission's  Political Representative associated with the
Ad hoc Group, under the terms of Article J.8 Part 5, was
not commented  upon.
58.  The responsible service in the Commission  deals
with all practical  day-to-day rnatters concerning the
financing of the EUAM from the general  budget.
59.  The role of the European  Parliament is limited
under current Treaty provisions relating to CFSP Joint
Actions, and the decision-making and management
arrangements for the EUAM that follow from them.
Article J.7 of the Treaty on European  Union provides for
consultation with and the supply of regular information30. 9. 95 t EN-l Official Journal of the European  Communities No C 28719
Observations  on
management
central decision making and
to  the Parliament on  joint  actions. Under these
provisions, however, the Parliament is not able to exert
influence  over their implementation.
60.  The Parliament  has shown considerable  interest  in
the implementation of the EUAM Joint Action, and in
the decision-making procedures(20).  In March 1,995 a
ioint ad /:oc mission of the Committee on Budgets and
the Committee on Budgetary Control visited Mostar to
examine at first hand the work of the EUAM, so that the
Committee on Budgets would be in a position to decide
on the transfer of appropriations  since ECU 50 million
for the 1995 budget of the EUAM had been placed by
the Parliament in the reserve. The mission  reported
favourably on what the EUAM had achieved to date in
terrns of reconstruction  and rehabilitation,  and despite its
objections to  the decision-making  procedures,  the
Committee approved the transfer rapidly so as not to
hinder the work of the EUAM.
State capitals. This slows up decision  making,  including
decisions on the release of funds to the EUAM. The
Council Secretariat which services the Presidency  and the
Working Party performs a  purely administrative
function.
63.  'S7hen the Administration  presented the EUAM
strategy document to the Presidency in July 1995 it was
not even discussed by the 'Working Party, and the
Administrator received no feedback on it. This document
provides a most useful elaboration in practical and
concrete terms of what the Administration intended to
achieve under the Memorandum  of Understanding.
64.  In practice, it is the service in the Commission
responsible for CFSP matters which is the most involved
in day-to-day  contact with the EUAM. However, the
powers of the Commission  in implementing a CFSP joint
action are much narrower than those which it exercises
when implementing non-CFSP  matters, being essentially
limited to tasks of budgetary  execution.
65.  Delays in the transfer of funds to the EUAM have
been experienced throughout its  existence.  At
31 December  '1,994, ECU 4,9 million, representing
1.5,2o/" of EUAM's  1994 budget, was unpaid by France
and the United Kingdom, out of the ECU 17 million that
was to be paid by the Member States(21).
66.  In addition,  the procedure  adopted  by the Council
for releasing funds to the EUAM, and the way in which
the  Cornmission implemented  this was needlessly
complex, and led to cash flow problerns. Thus, for the
1995 budget, entirely financed by the Community, the
Council released the funds in  three tranches. The
Commission then transferred the funds in three stages,
based on Commission  procedures normally applied to
individual projects. Thus, in effect, the Commission  split
the 1,995 budget of the EUAM into three parts and
treated each of them as though it was a separate  project.
As the EUAM had to report to the Commission  on how
it had utilized the advances against each corresponding
tranche of the budget, it devoted a considerable  part of
its limited staff resources in the Department of Finance
and Taxes to allocate actual expenditure accordingly.
67. 
"A 
consequence  of this procedure  was that the
EUAM requested  the first advances of the second  and
(21) The last payment in respecr of '1.994 was received  by the
EUAM on 2 March 1995. There were some errors in
Member  Stares' transters (Belgium underpaid while lreland
and Spain overpaid).
61,.  Shortcomings in the decision-rnaking  structures
and procedures for CFSP Joint Actions in general, and
for the Joint Action in  Mostar in  particular  have
adversely  affected the implementation of the Joint Action,
and the internal  functioning  of the EUAM, in particular
in the financial  area.
Central decision mak"ing and management
62.  The  six-monthly rotation in  the  Council
Presidency is, unfortunately,  ill-adapted  to the need for
continuity in management of a Joint Action such as
Mostar. The personnel responsible  for the ultimate
decisions and their execution change every six months,
and, as is normal with the functioning  of the Presidency
of the Council, the apparatus shifts frorn one Member
State capital to another as the Presidency rotates. The ad
hoc 'Working Party also has not provided a suitable
perrnanent structure  for the overall supervision of the
Joint Action. The officials that make up the 'Working
Party have this amongst many other responsibilities.
Examination  of the minutes of the rneetings shoW that
frequently decisions are carried over from one meeting to
the next, reflecting  the need to refer back to Member
(20) Report of the Committee  on Budgets on the financing of the
Common Foreign and Security Policy 18 October  1'994.
Report of the ad hoc mission of the Budgets Committee and
the  Budgetary  Control Committee of  the  European
Parliament to Mostar, 26 to 29 March 1995 (rapporteurs
Mme E. Miiller and M. Joan Colom i Naval) (ref).No C 28711,0 l-EN I Official Journal of the European Comrnunities 30.9.96
third tranches of the 1,995 budget, so that it  could
commit  new projects and obtain funds, before iustifying
the use of the first advance for the first tranche. At the
time of the second audit visit in October 1'995, the
EUAM's total  bank balance amounted to  DM
2,1 million, whereas its normal spending  rate was DM
1,1 million per week. As a result the EUAM was
temporarily  holding back payments  due to its suppliers.
Similar cash flow difficulties  occurred  in July 1'995.
68.  The auditors  pointed out to the EUAM and the
Cornmission that the procedures being followed were
unnecessarily  cornplex and did ngt improve  financial
control over the EUAM's budgetary execution. As a
consequence, it was decided to simplify procedures by
regarding all three budget years (1,994, 1,995 and 1.996)
as one continuous project.
Obseruations concerning financial management of the
EUAM
69.  At the level of the EUAM a number of internal
control weaknesses, sorne of  which were relatively
serious, were found to exist. The underlying reasons for
these can be traced back to the shortcornings  in the way
in which the EUAM was established.
70.  Firstly, the EUAM did not have from the outset a
set of standard operating procedures in the area of
financial management (defined purchasing  and market
testing  procedures,  procedures for the authorization  and
comrnitment of expenditure, payment  procedures, cash
handling procedures, etc).
71.  Secondly, the Department of Finance and Taxes
had insufficient capacity  and authority to ensure that the
other departments  followed procedures  and carried out
proper control checks prior  to  authorizing and
submitting  payrnent  requests. There was a tendency for
the individual department heads to work independently,
with their own procedures.
72.  Thirdly, the problems that arose from this were
exacerbated  by the shortage of staff resources in the
Finance and Taxes Department at the start. The Deputy
Head of Finance, who was responsible for ensuring
financial accounting and budgetary reporting, was not
appointed until two and a half months after the start of
operations.  By that time the individual departments  had
already started to do things in their own ways, which
were not always correct or consistent  one with another.
The financial management expertise within the individual
departments  was generallY weak.
73.  The EUAM organization structure  does not
provide for an independent financial  controller in the
sense of Community budget rules. There was initially,
however, a  separation of  functions between  those
responsible for  authorizing  expenditure (the
Adrninistrator, or  operational Departnlent Heads,
depending on the level or political importance of the
expenditure), and those responsible f.or checking
supporting  documentation,  that funds are avallable  and
thai eithei an order can be committed or a payment
rnade (either the Head or Deputy Head of Finance).
Following the Court's first visit in  Joly L995 a
recommendation was made to the EUAM and to the
Council to reinforce the internal control functions of the
EUAM by establishing rwo new posts. 'l'hese were a
budget manager  who would take over responsibility  for
checking the availability  of funds prior to committing
expenditure and making payments,  as well as budget
reporting and an internal auditor/evaluation  officer,  who
would check the functioning of procedures within the
departments, and evaluate the progress of departments
towards their objectives. The budget manager  was
appointed in  October 1.995, but  the  internal
auditor/evaluation  officer had still not been identified at
the end of 1995.
74.  The ability of the EUAM to manage and control
its funds in a satisfactory  manner has been seriously
hindered by the lack of  appropriate financial and
management  accounting  tools, capable of  recording
properly the EUAM's financial operations and generating  .
accounts along  with  meaningful management
information.  'When the EUAM was established neither
the Council nor the Cornmission provided it  with
appropriate tools. It  was not a simple task for the
individuals recruited to the EUAM to find and set up
apprbpriate  systems in the short term. The first attempt,
based on an accounting  package used in the Commission
delegations, was unsuccessful as the software was
u,trsuitable  for the EUAM's needs. By the time a second,
more suitable package had been found for the financial
accounts,  there was a large backlog of operations to be
checked and entered into the system which took until
July 1995 to achieve.
75.  This accounting package  has some shortcomings,
the most notable of which is that it cannot be used to
generate directly budget reports in the format required.
The EUAM employed consultants  in mid '1,995 to develop
a budget reporting system, but the results were not
entirely successful: what was proposed required an
unrealistic volume of work each month, with laborious
reconciliation exercises between the budget reports and
the financial  accounts. The budget manager appointed in
October 1995 has, however,  been successful in making
the system work.30. 9. 95 t-EN I Official Journal of the European  Communities No C 28711,1
76.  The weaknesses in internal control procedures  of
the EUAM led to a number of unsatisfactory practices.
Amongst  the most serious of these was the way in which
cash was handled. The situation in Mostar, particularly
during the first year of the EUAM's mandate, was such
that many operations had to be paid for in cash. Cash
payments amounted  to about 30t/" of total payments  in
1994 and "1.995 together. Substantial arnounts of cash
were, therefore, handled on a daily basis. 'While there
were some weaknesses  in the EUAM's procedures,  those
of the nilEU police were most unsatisfactory.  Large
volumes - 
up to DM 500 000 - 
were transported  by
the Police Paymaster on his own, in a camera bag. Cash
books were not written up in a timely manner, and
suppliers were not always required to sign for receipt of
cash. Unfortunately,  the EUAM did not provide funds to
the WEU police on an imprest basis. If it had, the \il7EU
police would have had to tighten up their procedures.
rVhen reconciling the 1994 and 1,995 cash advances
made by the EUAM to the'WEU police, it was found that
apparently  the EUAM had paid out in cash DM 582 000
(ECU 309 000) more than the ITEU police had recorded
as having received.  The EUAM is still investigating  this. A
cash count revealed cash in hand at DM 19 000 higher
than book cash. The Court did not identify anything to
indicate that cash had been misappropriated,  but it is
clearly most unsatisfactory that such differences should
arise. At the time of the second audit visit the \fEU
police was taking steps to  improve its  financial
management in general and its cash management in
particular. If  the nfEU Police are to  operate as a
semi-autonomous financial unit, funds should only be
provided from the EUAM on an imprest basis.
77.  Sorne of the practices used by departments for
ordering supplies, testing the market, and negotiating
prices with contractors departed  from best practice, and
there were differences in the ways that the different
departments dealt with the same suppliers.  However,
while this situation was not ideal, during the audit no  (f)
important  cases were identified where the EUAM had
lost monev  as a result.
78.  The Reconstruction Department  decided to use a
procurernent  agency to purchase vehicles and equipment.
for the water companies at the end of L994, and for the
plant hire agency in mid 1,995. This was a potentially
cost effective way of  proceeding, but there was
insufficient  monitoring of the actual costs incurred, on
the 1994 purchases.  As rapid procurernent  was required,
orders were placed on the basis of estimated  prices and
charges, amounting to DM 627 1,59. The actual prices
invoiced to the EUAM's account with the procurement
agency  were DM 704 475, i.e. an increase of 1,2"/", and
in  excess of  the authorized arnount. Neither the
Reconstruction  Department nor the Finance Department
were aware of this.
79.  Checks on a statistical sample of payments
representing  almost 30% by value of total EUAM
payments for the period 23 July '1.994 to 31 August
1.995, provided evidence of weak procedures in the
EUAM, notably:
(a) eleven of the contracts examined were unsatisfactory
for - a variety of reasons, including poor drafting,
absence of signatures or dates of signature,  omission
of completion  dates, thus rendering penalty  clauses
inoperative: also, different departments used different
contract formats:
(b) there was a lack of standard ordering procedures,
without specific provisions  for such matters as
delivery  conditions: some orders provided insufficient
technical specifications;
(c) although  formal tendering procedures  existed, there
was room for improvement, notably in the opening
and recording of offers;
(d) payments could be made on the Mostar banks with
one signature  only;
a few cases were noted where cash payments - 
in
one case of DM 500 000 - 
were given to an official
of the East Mostar local authority instead of to the
contractual beneficiary,  without any authorization
having been given by the beneficiary;
in 25 out of 70 payments, the supporting documents
presented  to Finance and Taxes were inadequate: for
example, faxed or photocopied  invoices were used
without certification of their conformity to  the
original, and without ensuring that further copies
could not be presented (t'), in some cases there was
no copy of the order or its acceptance;
there was frequently little evidence that checks had
been properly carried out by the responsible
department on invoices prior to  submission to
Finance and Taxes: indeed, Finance and Taxes
(tt) A few cases of double  payments in the EUAM and the.S7EU
police occured as a result. None of them were for large
amounts, and most were detected by the Department  of
Finance and Taxes' own internal  checks, and recoveries
made.
(e)
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frequently returned documents to the departments
for further checks and to obtain more adequate
supporting docurnentation.
The errors identified in the above
material affect on the accounts.
cases do not have a
Monitoring and supervision
80.  Generally supervision and managembnt of the
work of contfactors were good, with the electricity
section within DETI particularly  effective. Indeed, the
EUAM as a whole could have benefited from adopting
some of the simple but thorough procedures  applied in
this area. Probably  the most difficult area to manage was
the programme  of light to medium repairs to a very large
number of houses. Vith such a large programme it was
impossible for the department  concerned, with its
available professional staff, to visit each site and check
that what was being done was within the agreed  criteria.
However, some claims for payrnent from contractors had
been processed  despite the fact that they contained data
that indicated that some repairs were outside the criteria
fixed. The EUAM should have increased the resources
available to monitor the work of local authority bodies in
this area.
Arrangements  for the end of the EUAM's mandate
81.  There are a number of areas where decisions need
to  be taken concerning the arrangements  for  the
termination of the EUAM's operations. Firstly, there is
the question of the future use of the EUAM's assets,
estimated to have a net value in excess of ECU 3,1
million. These assets include the EUAM's cars and other
vehicles, furniture and equipment (including computers),
and the plant and equipment  for the plant hire agency in
East Mostar. It is important that there are clear decisions,
and clear procedures for whatever is decided.
82.  Secondly, the EUAM has established revolving
loan funds for small enterprises with the cornmercial
banks in Mostar. These funds total ECU 0,9 million. The
absence of  any decisions about the post-mandate
situation has led the EUAM to require payrfent of these
loans by the banks on or before the end of the mandate.
As the period for which the funds are available becomes
shorter, they becorne increasingly unattractive. It  is
desirable that the banks continue to have the use of these
funds, but with arrangements to ensure that they manage
them correctly, and continue to provide small business
loans of this type to enterprises in Mostar.
83.  The basic policy of the EUAM has been not to
undertake  proiects that extend beyond the end of its
mandate. However, for large proiects like the rebuilding
of the Hasari Brkii bridge, this is not feasible.
Administrative and technical capacity will be required
after the end of the mandate to check construction work
and payments to suppliers.
84.  The need for some capacity  to follow up the work
of the EUAM should be addressed well before its
mandate  comes to an end.
CONCLUSIONS
85.  The EU Adrninistration of Mostar was the first
major CFSP Joint Action of the European Union. It was
undertaken  in the extremely  difficult  circumstances of the
conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The objectives  that were
set for the EUAM were extremely  ambitious, and the
EUAM did not itself control the k.y elements that
influenced  whether or not the .objectives could be
achieved.
86.  In terms of working towards  the re-establishment
of a single administration  for the city of lv{ostar, with a
joint police force, organizing  democratic  elections, and
securing freedom of rnovement, progress  has been very
slow because of the unwillingness of the parties to work
together. Considerable progress has, however, been
achieved in the areas of rehabilitation,  reconstruction and
redevelopment.  Until the late surnrner of 1,995, whilb the
city was still subject to  sporadic  shelling, the only
significant  rehabilitation effort in the East was that
undertaken  by the EUAM. Once the shelling stopped,
however, and the people began to think that perhaps a
degree of stability was returning, they started  more
self-help rehabilitation.
87.  'When the EUAM was established, the rnethod
chosen for appointing personnel from the Mernber States
to the organisation was unsatisfactory, and it is more a
matter of chance than a consequence of the procedure
adopted that the team has managed to work well
together.  Also, insufficient attention was paid to the need
for the EUAM to  have from the outset financial30. 9. 96 tEN I Official Journal of the European Communities No C 28711,3
procedures and systems with an integrated system of
financial accounts and budget reporting, and sufficient
staff in this area.
88.  The weaknesses identified in the internal financial
managernent  and reporting of the EUAM stem largely
from these oversights at the start. The conditions of
Mostar at the start - 
for example the need to make a lot
of payments in cash - 
exacerbated the problems.
89.  It  is  necessary,  however, to  keep these
shortcomings in financial management in perspective.
First, the EUAM has progressively overcorne the main
weaknesses,  and the reinforcernent of the Finance and
Taxes tearn in October 1995 has helped considerably.
Secondly, these weaknesses have not had a seriously
adverse impact on the effectiveness  of the EUAM.
90.  The central decision-making and management
structure  is too diffuse to be effective. The Cornmission  is
the only part of the structure with operational  expertise
and capacity. It has exercised a degree of supervision of
the operation,  but its powers in implementing  a CFSP
Joint Action are much narrower than those it exercises
when implementing  non-CFSP matters, being essentially
limited to tasks of budgetary  execution.
RECOMMENDATIONS
9L.  An  effective permanent structure for  the
management  of CFSP Joint Actions is needed. This will
require interinstitutional agreement.
92.  Also, in the area of CFSP, planning should ensure
that adequate financial management  and accounting
procedures and systems are instituted from the outset,
with sufficient qualified staff. The permanent structure
referred to in paragraph  9L' above, should identify or
develop  basic tools and procedures for any future
action.
93.  The procedures  for appointing  expatriate staff to
Joint Actions  should ensure that there is choice between
candidates and opportunity for  the head of  the
organisation to-participate  in the process of selecting his
tearn.
This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg  at its meeting of 11 July
1996.




SUMMARY  OF OBJECTIVES FOR EUAM(I)
Displaced  people  and refugees
To a[[ow displaced persons to return home - 
through contacts with the UNHCR and other UN
agencies  and NGOs.
Legal  aspects
To establish a modus uiuendi dealing  with de facto laws applied  on each side of the divided  ciry, as well
as drafting  a new municipal  statute for Mostar, solving property  rights.
WEU police
To monitor  the demilitarization  of Mostar with Unprofor, to restore and to maintain public order with
local police forces, and to establish and train a unified police force in Mostar (UPFM),  capable  of




(r) As set out in the Memorandum of Understanding and developed  by the EUAM in its strategy  document.No C 28711,4 f ENl Official Journal of the European Communities 30. 9.96
(d) Finance and taxes
To maintain and control EU funds, ensuring their efficient and economic  use. Also, to assess the level of
funding .available to the two existing  Mostar  administrations  (East and 'Sfest), for the purpose  ol'
assessing whether the manner in which revenues  are collected is satisfactory,  and to introduce,
progressively  a single budget.
(e) Cityadministration
To build up and integrate  a modern administrative structure in the municipality of Mostar.
(f)  Economy  and transport infrastructure
To relaunch  the local economy,  and re-establish  the electricity and public transport network, and also
to rebuild the Carinski Most and certain other bridges,
(g) Reconstruction
To ,rrd..trke basic structural repairs to housing,  and co demolish  dangerous buildings where  necessary;
to restore a water supply to Mostar,  integrating the water companies in the East and the lWest; and to
improve  the capacity of the construction  industry through the supply of materials,  equipment  and
technicaUmanagerial  skills. AIso, to help create a sustainable  unified urban planning system.
(h) Education and culture
To complete the rebuilding programme for schools and kindergartens;  to continue the preservation of
historic and cultural buildings; to re-establish a single University for Mostar; and to establish integrated
schooling,
(i)  Cultural life, youth and sports
To re-establish multi-cultural life in the city; to rebuild youth centres and to facilitate youth exchange:
programmes;  to support sports clubs and their activities.
(j)  Health and social services
To re-establish a unified  health system for Mostar; to organize  extensive health system reforms
according  to federation health reform; to continue running  the Velmos hospital; to strengthen  mother
and child health care; and to complete and activate rhe main Bijeli Brijeg Mostar hospital in Mostar
'West,  once free'access and gqual treatment is guaranteed.
(k) Press
To support a mixed press and a fuee flow of
broadcasting  programmes;  and to bring about
(l)  Telecommunications
information in the city, as well as television and radio
an end to the media  war.
To  establish a  common Post and Telecommunications  (PTT) infrastructure;  a  decentralized
telecommunications system and to fully integrate Mostar in the inter-regional and international
network.
(m) Humanitarian  aid
To monitor and coordinate with the UNHCR, with the support of NGOs, humanitarian  aid delivered
to Mosrar.
(n) Freedom of movement
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EUAM budgeted  income foreseen 1,994 1,995 1,996 Total
o/ /o
1. EU Member State contributions








32,0 80,0 32,0 144,0 100,0
Tablc 1 - 
The EUAM's combined  budget for July 1994 to }rily 1996 and actual funding  received
(million ECU)
(1) Comprising ECU 20 million of the ECU 80 million budget for 1995 not yet commined or paid at 31. 10. 1.995, and a further  ECU 27,2 million of the
t994 and 1995 budgets not yet paid at 31. 10. 1,995  as well as the 1996 budget of ECU 32 million.
Source:  Court of Auditors,  from EUAM prepared  data.
Table 2 - 
Breakdown of Member  States  contributions  by GNP key and subsequent payments










1. EU Member State  - 
1,994 budget
contributions  overpayment  refund
2; General budget of the  - 
1.994 budget





3.1. German Ministry of Foreign  Affairs contribution  - 3.8. 7994


































Amount  paid - 1,994





































































Total 100,01(i) 17,00 12,67 4,92 17,59 0,59
(1) A small difference  arises as a result of the incorrect application of the GNP key which  totalled 100,1 7o instead  of 1,007".


















Public utilities 1 - 
'$7ater and sanitation
Public  utilities 2 - 
PTT and garbage
















































Economic  sector support 12,6 11,3 13,9 12,4 11,8 16,7
Education,  culture, sport lO,2 9rl 11,8 10,5 914 12,9
Running and common costs 8,3 714 816 77 6r8 912





















Health and social services 20,5 18,3 815 716 3,8 5,2





















Reintegration of displaced persons 5.1 416 417 412 L,2 1,7
Total 112,0 100,0 112,0 100,0 73,3 100,0
Table 3 - 
Breakdown by sector of EUAM actual expenditure, compared ludrth 1994/1995 budgets
(1) Includes  both the 1994 budget  and the 1995 initial budget  following Council Deeision 95l23lCFSP  of 5 February 1995.
(2) Includes  both the 1994 budget  and the 1995 final budget (presented to the Council  Presidency on 27 September  1995).
(million ECU)
Source:  EUAM data, 5 February 1995.No C 287118 fEfr_]  Official Journal of the European Communities 30. 9.96
Table 4 - 
Breakdown by sector of 1.994-1995 EUAM  commitments, compared  with revised budgets
(million ECU)




































Public utilities L -  Ifater and
sanitation
Public utilities  2 -- PTT and garbage


























3 Economic  sector support 216 2,6 100,0 11,3 10,8 95,6





















5 Health and social  services 0,5 016 120,0 8,0 714 92,5
6 Education, culture, sport
Education building  and equipment






































8 Reintegration  displaced persons 0r1 0r1 100,0 416 416 100,0
9 Runing and common costs 413 412 97,7 413 3r0 69,8
Total 32,0 32,0 100,0 80,0 70,2 87,8
(t) The 1995 final budget  (presented to the Council Presidency on 27 September  1995).
(2) Data not available  as rhe Department was only first split in 1995.
Source: EUAM data, 5 February 1995.30. 9. 96 TErl Official Journal of the.European Communities No C 28711,9
THE REPLIES OF THE COM-N/IISSION AND THE ADMINISTRATOR  OF MOSTAR
1,. Introduction, obiectives and implementation of
EUAM
The introduction and summary
operations (point 13 to 30) do
particular  comment on the part of
of the principal
not call for any
the Commission.
Point 16: It remains to be seen whether the proposed
elections  will result in the creation of a unified central
city administration and what, if  any type of city
budget might emerge. The likelihood  is, however, that
since any central administration will, by definition,
involve Federal and Cantonal  participation,  at least in
terms of tax revenue, that no immediate  progress will
be made on this aspect hence EUAM involvement in
creating a  unified budget remains unlikely.
(Adrninistrator) 
4.
Point 22: The situation improved  considerably
towards the end of the vear. (Administrator)
Point 28: Ve would like to point out that also a
youth centre in  Cernica (Mostar East) has been
completed and a large number of cultural societies
have been supported.  EUAM is the main actor in the
renewal of cultural life in Mostar. (Administrator)
2. EUAM budget and expenditure
The section on the EUAM's budget and expenditure
(points 31 to 39) does not call for any particular
comrnent  on the part of the Commission.
3. Organization of the EUAM
As regards the comments concerning the EUAM's
organization  (points 40 to  54), the Commission
would point out that the practical  arrangements  for
implernenting joint actions had not yet been defined  5.
in the EUAM's preparatory phase. Given the need to
act quickly in order to maintain the mornentum of
the'V7ashington peace accords (18 March 1994),
some degree of improvisation  (see points 41. and 42)
was inevitable if any progress was to be made. The
definition of  administrative and  operational
expenditure  and choice of budget heading  differed
from one institution to  another (Council and
Parliament), as the Court points out (points 42, 43
and 44lr.
The Comrnission shares the Court's view that
preparatory expenditure  incurred in rnounting a joint
action can be regarded as operational.  However,  as
no decision  had been taken on the action's budget it
could not be financed by the Cornmunity budget
(point 45).
The Court is correct in stating (points 46 and 47)
that the decision-making  process is too complex to be
able to meet operational needs promptly.
Points 50 and 54: The Commission  shares the Court's
implicit view that the selection and appointrnent
procedures  and breakdown of responsibilities  for
senior management in  an  operation of  such
magnitude  and duration need to be reviewed  and
irnproved in the future.
Decision-making structures
Point 56: It is correct that the Administration is not
obliged to report specifically to the Commission
under the Council decisions.  However, when a budget
tranche is  'released' by  the  Council, the
Administration is  required to  report to  the
Commission on the financial implementation of the
funds in question under the agreernents concluded
befween the Cornmission  and the Adrninistration.
Point 64: The Commission has endeavoured  to
administer  funds within the confines of the powers
given to it by the Treaty. However, it  shares  the
Court's view that its authority is less extensive in the
case of this Joint Action than under the first pillar.
The problems which have arisen (points 66 and 67)
have been overcome,  as the Court notes (points 68).
The variods tranches  made available under the 1,995
budget have been grouped together, the 1,996 budget
has been released  in one tranche and made available
to the Administration in  one instalment by the
Commission.
Financial management of the EUAM (points 69 to 79
arrd 87 to 89)
Point 70: Since the Administrator is  primarily
responsible for administering  aid for Mostar under
the aegis of the Comrnission  and in view of the
unprecedented  nature of  the  operation,  the
Commission  had no  directly transposable legal
framework  it could use for the Administration.  It was
therefore left up to the Administration itself, and in
particular the Department of Finances and Taxes, to
put such a framework  in place in collaboration  with
the Commission. This was gradually undertaken in
the light of local conditions,  the experience acquiredNo C 287120 Er] Official Journal of the European Communities 30. 9. 95
and the recommendations  rnade by the Court during
its audit.
The fact that it took over a year and that there is still
room for'improvement is largely due, as the Court
also underlines,  to the shortage of staff resources to
administer and put in place such a framework.
Points 7"L to 73: TheCommission and the majority of
Member States had difficulty in identifying suitable
officials who could be made available  at short notice
(the Council decision was taken in May 1994 and the
Administration started operating on 23 July 1'994).
The Head of Department, a Commission  official, was
appointed on 1 September 1994 and his deputy
(United Kingdom official) was recruited with effect
from 1 October  1,994. Although  the budget  manager
requested in July 1,995 was rnade available fairly
quickly by Sweden (1 October L995) the request for a
financial controller (evaluation  officer) made to
another Member State was not met (point 73).
The lack of authority  highlighted by the Court is due
to this inherent weakness in the conditions under
which the operation was decided upon, negotiated
with local parties and implemented.  Given the lack of
pre-established  procedures it was quite normal for
departments to apply rules with which they were
farniliar as well as they could. There was not
sufficient financial  capacity gradually to introduce
common rules and police their observance.
The deficiencies in the internal  financial  management
procedures of  other departments are  largely
attributable to the fact that they are applied by local
staff without appropriate experience  who have had to
be trained on the spot by department  heads who were
unfamiliar  with such duties.
In the event the EUAM was unable to obtain an
evaluation officer along the lines first envisaged. The
Council secretariat sent a 'political evaluation officer
with a different focus on an exploratory visit'. It is
now too late in the day for a 'financial' evaluation
officer to  make any meaningful  contribution.
(Administrator)
Point 74: ltis correct that neither the Council nor the
Commission were able to  provide EUAM with
appropriate financial and accounting management
tools. This is due to the unprecedented,  innovatory
nature of the operation. It was the first time that the
Presidency,  with the Commission's  assistance,  had
had to  set up a full  municipal administration.
Moreover,  the arrangernents had had to be worked
out and implemented  very quickly. Many of the
difficulties encountered  on the ground, to which the
Court has drawn attention, could not have been
foreseen (e.g. relations between the EU team and the
I7EU police team, see point 7 below).
Points 76 to 79: The deficiencies and irregularities
identified  by the Court have been corrected as far as
possible by the Adrninistration.
Point 76:The recent arrival of a police officer with an
accounting background has  led  to  a  vast
improvement,  both in the handling of the imprest
system set up after the Court of Auditors visit in
October  1.995, and in  the contribution  of  new
systems and tightening of procedures.
Despite continuing efforts we have been unable to
reconcile the discrepancy of DM 582 000 between
our records and those of the \U7EU  police.  'We suspect,
however, that'the major part relates to purchases of
vehicles in 1,994. The early problems surrounding the
setting-up of both the EUAM and the WEU police
resulted,  necessarily in ad hoc procedures.
The WEU police records for "1,994 are rudimentaty
and there was no cornputerized system. This taken
together with the fact that the police contingent
rotates on a six-monthly  basis with neither handover
periods nor handover notes left by depa:rting officers
plus the fact that few, if any, officers in the finance
cell had any previous financial experience,  served to
exacerbate the. problem.
It seems unlikely,  however, that we will succeed in
reconciling the book difference in which event we
therefore intend to write it off. (Administrator)
Point 78: EUAM has instituted much more rigorous
checking of the heavy plant hire account which is
handled by the reconstruction departmbnt in the first
instance. It is now possible to query any difference  in
good time. (Administrator)
Point 79 (a)r General  standards of contracts have
improved. There is much closer scrutiny of draft
contracts carried out by the assistant/legal  adviser.
Point 79 (b): EUAM has issued standard  ordering
forms 'purchase orders' and continues to  work
towards irnprovement of specific provisions.
Point 79 (c)r The responsibilities  of the Tendering
Committee have been expanded to cover all aspects
of contract and procurement awards.  Procedures have30. e. 96 t ENI Official Journal of the European Communities No C 287121
6.
been improved and redrafted leading to much tighter
control.
Point 79 (d): Changed to a double  signature system in
October 1995 immediately  after the auditors raised
the question. (Administrator)
Arrangements for the end of the EUAM's mandate
(points 81 to 85)
The Commission  is aware of the problem of the
EUAM's assets and obligations  beyond its mandate,
which ends on 22 July or 3L December  1,996.
Point 81: No decisions have yet been made and time
is passing. EUAM and the Commission need to
address the question of  disposal of  assets as a
priority. (Administrator)
Point 82: Similarly decisions on the future of the SEP
funds are necessary and urgent. (Administrator)
7. Conclusions (points 85 to 90)
Point 87: 'STithout wanting to disagree with the
Court's analysis, the Commission  r,vould point out
that it  would have taken much more tirne ro
introduce  more efficient procedures for personnel
selection and financial management than political
imperatives allowed. It is doubtful whether, without
previous experience of  such an operation,  more
appropriate procedures could have been identified by
the  central decision-making and  management
structure,  whose limitations are pointed out by the
Court (point 90).
8. Recommendations
Point 91: The Commission agrees with the Court on
the need for a permanent  operational structure to
monitor joint actions from beginning  to end.
Points 92 and 93: The Commission agrees with the
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